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ABSTRACT

A social analog of a short-delay conditioning paradigm in
Pavlovian learning was used to test predictions concerning
the influence of stimulus context on human judgments of

causality-

The learning experiment was masked by describing

it as a study testing a computerized employee evaluation

system.

Subjects were presented information about a

hypothetical worker and a fictitious company's level of

productivity representing a nine month period. Consistent
with contemporary conditioning models of associative

learning, the results indicated that subject judgments of
the worker's causal priority for the company productivity

effect progressively strengthened as a function of repeated

worker-productivity pairings.

And, limits of this

acquisition effect of causal judgments were influenced by
the frequency with which the production goal was met in the
worker's absence.

The problem of context effects in

supervisor—worker and therapist—client evaluations are
discussed.
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INTRODUCTION

The effects of context on psychological processes is a

problem of fundamental importance in all major areas of
psychology.

Figure and ground in perception, adaptation-

level in psychophysics, Lewin/s concept of life space and
stimulus selection in learning are only a few of the

examples of context effects.

Despite the recognized

interest in context effects in social psychology, and in

psychology generally, scant attention has been devoted to
context effects in social causal judgments (attribution).
One of Heider's (1944) most celebrated insights captures

this neglect.

He stated that although "changes in the

environment are almost always caused by acts of persons in
combination with other factors, the tendency exists to

ascribe the changes entirely to persons" (p.361).

Presently, attribution theory is an amorphous
collection of observations about naive causal inferences.

Cook and Campbell (1979) have pointed out that, "The

epistemology of causation....is at present in a productive
state of near chaos" (p.10).

Despite nobel attempts by

social psychologists, Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley

(1972), to clarify the rules the average person uses to
infer the causes of observed behavior, attribution theories

are arguably in need of synthesis.

The present study is

part of a series of research projects designed to
investigate human causal judgments from a contemporary

learning-theoretical perspective.

Specifically, the

following research attempted to develop a Neo-Hullian

paradigm to generate and test predictions concerning the
influence of context on social causal judgments.
Social Psvcholoqv

Psychology is not alone in presenting an indistinct
view of causality.

In philosophy, the meaning of causality

has been an issue of controversy for centuries (for a

review, see Bunge, 1979).

The majority of contemporary

ideologies concerning causal judgment issues originated from
the seminal works of British associationist, David Hume.

Employing a highly deterministic associative process to
explain causal judgments, Hume (1739/1964) postulated
several rules;

spatio-temporal contiguitv - the cause and

effect must be contiguous in time and space; temporal

prioritv - the cause must be prior to the effect; and
constant union - the cause and effect must occur together.

Also, Hume added a fourth rule: that the same cause always

produces the same effect and that the same effect never
arises but from the same cause.

Although generally credited to John Stuart Mill, Hume

pbstulated two final rules of inference concerning causal
judgment:

similaritv - if several different objects produce

the same effect, it must be by means of some quality common

among them, and difference - the difference in the effects

of two resembling objects must proceed from that particular
in which they differ.

The coordinated application of these

two rules also lends itself to later models of attribution

which investigated choosing among rival causes the one most

predictive of a particular effect (see Kelley, 1972;
Wasserman, 1990).

Critical realists (e.g., Harre, 1972) describe causal

perceptions as subjective constructions of the mind.

They

argued that seeking causes and effects is an innate

tendency, and has an evolutionary adaptive role.

Critical

Realists purport that although causal relationships exist
independent of our consciousness, perceptions do not.

We

therefore focus on manipulative relations between cause (X)

and effect (Y) and use the information for survivalCritical realists echo Aristotle's assumption that

observation in and of itself is not sufficient to understand

nature.

They suggest that, in order to observe the

relationship between X and Y, variables must be manipulated

(i.e., causal inference results from actions). As a result,
experimentation is a natural outgrowth of our innate
tendency to search for causal laws.

Historical observations (e.g., Hume, 1739/1964; Mill,

1972) of causality suggest that the insights of the earliest
thinkers about behavior can importantly apprise and motivate

current research and theory in causal judgment.

As a

result, psychologists within various research traditions
have focused on specific facets of causality which were

emphasized by different philosophers and made operational
tests of these concepts.

For example, Einhorn and Hogarth

(1986) reported that, "workers in attribution theory have
tended to follow Kelley (1967) in emphasizing Mill's
criteria of concdmitant variation and the method of

differences; Michottes (1946) classic demonstrations of how

people perceive causes relies heavily on ideas advanced by
Hume; and Shultz's (1982) work has been influenced by Kant's
notions that causal relations are characterized by forces of

generative transmission between cause and effect" (p. 3).
The relevance of contextual factors in determining

probable cause has only recently developed in social
psychology (Einhofn & Hogarth, 1986).

Previously, behavior

was generally seen as more salient than the situation,
exemplified by Heider's (1958) statement that "behavior

engulfs the field" (p. 1). Although attribution research is
quite diverse, much of it can be traced to the work of
Heider as operationalized by Jones and Davis (1965) and

Kelley (1967, 1972, 1973). Similar to the critical
realist's perspective,

Heider's early work on phenomenal

causality (1944) emphasized the human motive to stabilize
the perceived environment by appropriate cause-effect

assignments.

Heider suggested that people strive to bring

order and meaning to their world by determining the
attribution of intention, ability, and environmental
properties.

Specifically, Heider argued that perceivers seek the
invariances underlying behavior in order that people and the

environment appear more predictable.

Consistent with

Heider's view, the learning-theoretical viewpoint of this
thesis is that "social effects or outcomes" will elicit
automaticalIv a search for causes and a generation of cause-

effect statements on the part of the observer (see Dickinson

& Balleine, 1994).

We term this activity invariance seeking

action. and consider it to be analogous to an unconditioned
response (See Rule 3 below, p.18).
In an effort to make Heider's theory more amenable to

empirical test, Jones and Davis (1965) formulated the theory
of Gorrespondent inference which examined the relationship
between the effects of an action and the personal

disposition inferred by those effects.

In particular, Jones

and Davis suggested that we pay more attention and infer

dispositional "cause" to those behaviors of others which are

freely chosen, produce noncommon effects, and are low in
social desirability.

Jones and Davis argued that this

initial reaction creates a dispositional "perceptual anchor"
in the observer which is resistant to amelioration when

additional information concerning situational constraints

surrounding the behavior is provided.

Similarly, empirical

evidence (e.g., Ajzen, 1971) demonstrated support for the

Jones and Davis theory of noncommon effects which suggested
that the fewer distinctive effects an actor has for an

action, the more informative is that action about

identifying dispositions of the actor.

Kelley (1973) examined Heider's suggestion that people

might employ a variant of Mill's method of difference when
choosing an actual cause from a large repertoire of

potential causes.

Consistent with early Pavlovian

conditioning models which discussed contiguity of events,

Kelley developed a comprehensive model of causation

which

described the covariation principle of attribution: "An

effect is attributed to the one of its possible causes with
which over time it covaries" (p. 108).

In other words, the

effect is attributed to that condition which is present when

the effect is present and which is absent when the effect is
absent (Kelley & Michela, 1980).

Kelley explicitly

distinguished between two different cases of attribution
theory - one in which the observer has information from

multiple observations and one in which the attributor has
information from only a single observation.

Contemporary

researchers also distinguish between what are termed
experienced and described causal situations.

The

covariation principle as defined requires multiple
observations, experienced causal situations, or Bertrand

Russell's concept of "knowledge by acquaintance" (see

Shanks, 1991).

In addition, Kelley (1972) identified three
attributional criteria which employ the covariation

principle: consensus (the extent to which others react in
the same manner to a stimulus or event as the individual in

question); consistencv (the extent to which the individual
reacts to this same stimulus or event in the same way on

other occasions); and distinctiveness (the extent to which
the individual reacts in the same manner to other, different

stimuli or events).

McArthur (1972) systematically varied

consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information
pertaining to a behavioral act (e.g., John laughs at the

comedian).

Subjects were instructed to indicate the cause

they perceived as most plausible.

Consistent with previous

trends in the literature (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1969), and
Heider/s insightful analysis, the results indicated that
observers tend to attribute behavior to dispositions rather
than context.

When multiple observations are not possible, however,
attribution for a single instance is presumed to follow

Kelley's (1972, 1973) principles of discounting and
augmenting, rather than the principle of covariation.

The

discounting principle, according to Kelley (1973) holds that

"The role of a given cause in producing a given effect is
discounted if other plausible causes are also present" (p.

113).

For example, in personnel assessment (the masking

task in this thesis) the evaluation of a specific worker's

effectiveness in contributing to a company's production
outcome will be discounted if other workers (i.e., plausible
causes) are present.

According to Kelley's (1973) theory of attribution,
causes can also be facilitative.

Kelley's augmenting

principle suggests, "if for a given effect, both a plausible
inhibitory cause and a plausible facilitative cause are

present, the role of the facilitative cause in producing the
effect will be judged greater than if it alone were present
as a plausible cause for the effect" (p. ll4).

in other

words, a cause can succeed in producing the behavior in the

face Of important barriers.

For example, suppose Bill is a

worker at a company which in the past has not met its

production qudtas.

Bill predicts the company will not meet

its productivity goal.

The company hires a new employee,

Joe, to work with Bill and the productivity level of the
company increases.

As a result, Joe's perceived

effectiveness as a contributor to the company meeting its

productivity goal, in the context of a worker Bill, who does
not predict meeting tho company goal, is expected to be
augmented.

Although, discussions of attribution do not often focus
on what Tolman and Brunswick (1935) called the "causal

texture of the environment," contemporary learning theory
has focused much attention on the topic of context in

conditioning (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner &

Rescorla, 1972).

And^ contemporary learning theorists

(e.g.. Alloy & Tabachanik, 1984; Gluck & Bower, 1988) have
suggested that human causal judgments closely parallel the
conditioned responses in animals in associative learning
studies (See Lovibond, 1988).

Specifically, Rescorla (1988)

noted that "The CS/US relations required for conditioning

are very similar to those that a rational scientist would
demand to conclude that the CS is the cause of the US" (p.
340, see also Dickinson, 1980).

Contemporary learning theorists have also extended the
role of contiguity in causal judgments to include a

contingency mechanism (Shanks & Dickinson, 1987; Williams,

1994). Attribution research which has relied heavily on a
simple contiguity mechanism (Kelley's covariation

principle), may also benefit from this extension.

We

suggest that contemporary learning theory may provide
valuable theoretical tools needed to extend our

understanding of human casual analysis.
Learning Psvchology

Our approach to examining cause-effect relationships is

to employ a number of learning-theoretical concepts. This

particular research strategy has developed an impressive
record with regard to the explanation of existing empirical
relationships and the generation of testable new

predictions. Previously, the most basic and well-studied

learning model has been Pavlovian conditioning.

In

Pavlovian conditioning a previously neutral stimulus, the

conditioned stimulus (CS), is associated with a biologically

significant stimulus, the unconditional stimulus (US).

As a

result of the pairings of the CS and US, the conditioned
stimulus (CS) comes to elicit a response, termed the

conditioned response (CR).

Pavlov and other early learning

theorists (e.g., Hull, 1943; Spence, 1956) assumed that this
simple temporal contiguity or joint occurrence of a CS

(cause) and US (effect) was sufficient for associative
learning.

Over the two past decades, however, it has become

apparent that conditioning is neither this simple nor this
mechanical.

'

Conditioning is no longer seen as a low-level

mechanical process in which the control over a response is
passed from one stimulus to another.

Drawing from the

associationist tradition in philosophy, conditioning is
viewed as the learning that results from exposure to

relations among events in the environment.

The

insufficiency of contiguity for producing conditioning can
be illustrated by results that have been available for some
time.

Rescorla (1968) examined the insufficiency of

contiguity for producing Pavlovian conditioning and
determined that it is the contingency between the CS and US

which allows conditioning to occur.

Rescorla described

contingency as "the relative probability of occurrence of
10

the US in the presence of the CS as contrasted with its
probability in the absence of the CS" (p.l).

Kamin (1969) in a critical investigation of
conditioning known as the "blocking effect" contributed
evidence for Rescorla's (1968) contingency principle.

Kaitiin

demonstrated that conditioning to one element (X) of a

compound stimulus (AX) could be blocked by prior training to
the other element (A).

For example, a light (A) was

conditioned to predict a shock, and then a compound stimulus

consisting of a light (A) and a tone (X) was paired with the
same level of shock.

When the tone (X) was tested alone

conditioning to X was attenuated compared to the responses
to X in another group receiving onlv AX compound

conditioning trials (i.e., no prior experience with A).

The

blocking effect demonstrated by Kamin's experiment
undermined the sufficiency of contiguity for associative

learning even though both groups received equal pairings of
light+ tone/shock.

According to simple contiguity both groups should have

responded similarly to the X stimulus.

Hence, the

effectiveness of the shock US for producing associative

learning depended on the relationship between the tone CS
and the expected outcome (Kamin, 1969; Kremer, 1978;

Rescorla, 1968; Wagner, 1969).

In Kamin's research the tone

was redundant relative to the light OS in predicting the
shock and therefore responding to the tone CS was reduced.

11

Rescorla and Wagner advanced a distinct forinulation of this

general proposition (see Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner &
Rescorla, 1972).
As a result of the work described above, contemporary

learning literature reveals a lively interest in the impact
of context on conditioning.

The issues raised by contextual

variation fall within a general class of problems termed
stimulus selection.

Rudy and Wagner (1975) briefly describe

the stimulus selection problem as "one of specifying the
rules whereby a relationship will or will not appear to be
learned about depending upon the context of environmental
events in which it is embedded" (p. 270).

For instance, if

the CS is a compound of two stimuli, and one;of them is more
salient or noticeable than the other, nearly all

conditioning which occurs may be controlled exclusively by
the more salient stimulus; the less salient stimulus may be

completely overshadowed.

Overshadowing is another phenomena

that argues against the simple contiguity mechanism in
associative learning.

Another example of the stimulus selection problem is

inhibitory conditioning which occurs when a stimulus signals
the absence of the reinforcer (i.e., US).

A conditioned

inhibitor is produced when one CS (A), is consistently

reinforced (+), and a compound containing A, and a second CS

(X) is consistently nonreinforced (-).

As a result of such

training, X can be shown to possess inhibitory properties.
12

That is, presenting X can reduce the level of responding to
another independently trained, excitatory stimulus (e.g.,

Bouton, 1994; Konorski, 1948; Pavlov, 1927).

A series of

experiments strongly suggests that simple contiguity of the
CS and US fails to capture the relation required to produce

excitatory and inhibiting conditioning.

In other words,

conditioning depends not simply on the contiguity between
the GS and US but rather on the information that the CS
provides about the US.
Contemporarv Learning Perspective

An interest in contextual variables, and their effect

on causal judgments, although not normally addressed in
terms of stimulus selection, has recently developed in

contemporary studies of causality judgments (Shanks &

Dickinson, 1987; Algom & Bizman, 1983; Alloy & Tabachnik,
1984; Gluck & Bower, 1988; Wasserman, 1990).

Shanks and

Dickinson (1987), for example, echoed Hume's belief that, "a
causal judgment is seen as reflecting no more than the

strength of the relevant association between the mental

representations of the cause and effect, with the principles
governing such attributions being those of associative
learning" (p. 230).

Hence, the impact of event

contingencies developed within conditioning research may
well illuminate the processes underlying human judgments of
causality.

Similar to other contemporary learning theorists (e.g.,

13

Rescorla, 1968; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), Shanks and
Dickinson also suggested that contiguity alone does not

provide evidence about the necessity of a cause.

They

argued that a simple contiguity-sensitive mechanism could
not answer the question, "Is the target cause necessary for
the action to occur?"

Shanks and Dickinson reported that

contiguity mechanisms could not distinguish between pairings
in which the putative cause was imperative for the effect
from those in which the conjunction was fortuitous (illusory
correlation).

In an effort to demonstrate that causal judgments are

affected by the factors critical for the type of associative
learning seen in conditioning. Shanks and Dickinson arranged
contiguous pairings of events within different causal

backgrounds.

Judgments based simply upon the number of

pairings were expected to yield the same rating for
effectiveness of the target cause.

The first sequence was

considered a positive contingency between the action (CS)
and outcome (US), whereas the US occurred only in the

presence of the CS.

In the second sequence, there was a

noncontingent relationship between the action and the

outcome, the US was just as likely to occur in the absence
of the CS as in its presence.

The results indicated that

the higher the baserate of the US alone, the less

conditioning to the target stimulus occurred.

In effect,

conditioning and therefore the judgments of cause, were

14

sensitive to the baserate of US occurrence against which a
CS/US contiguity occurred.

15

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

In summary, several theoretical frameworks have been

postulated to explain human perception of causation (e.g.,
Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelly & Michela, 1980;
Michotte, 1963; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987; Wasserman, 1980).

Although the historical work of attribution theorists using
inferential or rule governed models is clearly

sophisticated, they do not yet contain a mechanism for

predicting and explaining social attributional contextual
phenomena (e.g., acquisition, blocking, contingency effects,
overshadowing).

As a result, traditional attribution

research may be subject to limitations when explaining

cause-effect judgments.

By employing a general programmatic

approach termed "extension of liberalized S—R theory" by
Neal Miller (1959), we offer a context sensitive theory of
social attribution modeled on Rescorla and Wagner (1972).

The Neo-Hullian theory developed by Rescorla and Wagner

powerfully addresses the stimulus selection problem in
learning research.

Neo—Hullian theory has been developed

primarily to predict individual behavior in controlled
laboratory situations, howeyer, it has been extended to many

social processes with considerable success (e.g., Cottrell,
1968; Cramer, Weiss, Steigleder, & Balling, 1985; Bollard &
16

Miller, 1950; Lott & Lott, 1968; 1972; Steigleder, Weiss,
Cramer, & Feinberg, 1978; Zajonc, 1965).

The context

sensitive theory developed here is designed to predict and

explain acquisition effects, contingency effects, and other
related contextual phenomena in attribution.

Specifically,

the influence of a contingency mechanism for determining the

acquisition and strength of causality judgments in a common
social situation will be tested.

Technique of Theorv Construction

Through the use of analogy, a relatively well
understood conditioning paradigm will be used to guide the

investigation of a less well-understood research area (e.g.,
social causal judgments in context).

In particular,

analogies will be drawn between contemporary associative
learning variables and the variables assumed to be important
in the development of social causal judgments.

A dictionary

of analogies (Rules of Correspondence) relates the

independent and dependent variables of the model to the
corresponding (analogous) independent and dependent
variables of social attribution.

Consistent with this

construction, the relations holding among the variables in
the conditioning model should, theoretically, hold among the
corresponding social attribution variables (Campbell, 1920;

Hesse, 1966, 1974, 1980; Masterman, 1980; Oppenheimer,
1956).

The Rules of Correspondence relating the variables in
17

classical conditioning to the variables of social
attribution are given here and are numbered for later
reference.

Corresponding to a conditioned stimulus (CS), or

antecedent stimulus, is a discriminable social stimulus,
such as a worker (Rule 1).

Corresponding to an

unconditioned stimulus (US), or a consequent stimulus, is a

social stimulus, such as a fictional company's productivity
level, which elicits "invariance seeking action (ISA)" (Rule

2), and the ISA so elicited is analogous to an unconditioned
response (UR; Rule 3).

The conditioned form of the OR

analog (speed, probability, or amplitude of "invariance
seeking action") corresponds to a conditioned response (CR;

Rule 4).

The number of CS-US pairings (reinforced trials)

corresponds to the number of CS analog-US analog pairings,
such as the number of times a worker is paired with a

company's productivity goal being met (Rule 5).

Rule 5

constitutes an "invariance seeking action" acquisition
trial.

A trial on which a worker is not followed by

information regarding a company meeting its productivity

goal represents a CS alone or extinction trial (Rule 6).
Presenting US-analogs in the absence of CS-analogs
constitutes a US alone trial, such as the company meeting

its productivity goal when a specific worker was not present

(Rule 7). Corresponding to a reinforced compound CS trial
is a ISA trial where two or more social stimuli, such as'two

workers, are jointly paired with the company meeting its
18

productivity goal (Rule 8).

Corresponding to CS saliency is

the saliency or vividness of the CS analog (Rule 9).

The

power of a Social stimulus, such as the level of company 

productivity, to elicit "invarianCe seeking action"
corresponds to the intensity or strength of the US (Rule
10).

Although the rules developed above are illustrative,
rather than exhaustive, they are sufficiently detailed to

permit the generation of acquisition and contingency effect
hypotheses using classical conditioning as a model.
Hvpotheses

Acquisition Effects.

In classical conditioning acquisition

of a conditioned response is an increasing function of the

number of CS-US pairings, or reinforced trials.

Hence, we

predict, as a function of repeated pairings of a worker, Joe
(CS analog) and company productivity information (US analog)

judgments of Joe as a cause of the company meeting its
productivity goal (CR analogs ISA's) will progressively
strengthen (Rules 1^5).

Continqencv Effects.

The contingency effects noted above

suggest that causal judgments will not simply be a function
of the frequency of CS-US analog presentations.

Rather they

are expected to be influenced by how often the worker and
productivity information appear together and how often the
productivity information occurs in the absence of the
worker.

Based upon contemporary learning research, and the

19

Rules of correspondence listed above, we predict that the

limits of the above stated acquisition effect will be
determined by the frequency with which the productivity
information is provided without the worker present (Rule 7).

More specifically^ we predict a neqative relationship
between the number of times the productivity goal is met in
the absence of the worker, and the strength of causal
judgments to the worker.

20

GENERAL METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were 40 males and 40 females ranging in age
from 18 to 52 who were recruited from courses offered at

California State University.

All subjects were naive with

respect to the experimental task and were randomly assigned
to one of four experimental conditions.

All subjects were

treated in accordance with the ethical principles of the

American Psychological Association.

Five female and two

male: experimenters, all members of the Social Learning
Research Group, conducted the experiment.
Experimental Design

In classical conditioning a discriminable antecedent
stimulus CS, is paired with a discriminable consequent
stimulus, US.

Similarly, in the present study the CS was a

fictional part-time worker, named Joe, and the US was the

productivity information of a fictional company where Joe
worked.

The primary independent variable was the US alone

baserate, or number of times the US (productivity
information) appeared in the absence of the CS (Joe).

A

repeated variable, number of acquisition trials, constituted
the second independent variable.

The experimental design

can be described as a 4 x 18 (Groups x Trials) design.
21

The

subjects' strength of causal judgments (i.e., invariance
seeking action) defined the primary dependent variable.

A

secondary dependent variable was the subjects' ratings of
confidence in their causal judgments.
Masking Task

The learning experiment was masked by describing it as a

study testing a computerized Employee Evaluation System.

This procedure allowed for repeatedly pairing a worker with
information about the company's productivity level.

The

instructions indicated that, "In this experiment we are

interested in testing a computerized employee evaluation

system.

Your cooperation is necessary for testing the

usefulness of this automated program.

In order to carefully

test the effectiveness of the system, it will be necessary

for you to assume the role of a production supervisor in a
large company."

Further instructions indicated that, "Joe

is a college student who is available for part-time
employment.

It is important to evaluate him carefully

because he will be considered for full-time employment upon

graduation." (see Appendix A for the complete instructions.)
Apparatus and Materials

Previous research (Shanks & Dickinson, 1987) suggested

that computer presentation of stimuli is an effective way to
study the learning of causal relationships.

Therefore, all

communication between researcher and participant occurred
via an IBM 360 PC subject module.
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The computer program,

Micro Experimental Language (MEL) version 120, served to

present a series of visual cues and response manipulanda.

The MEL program controlled presentation of the instructions,
the CS (Joe) and the US (company productivity information),
and the employee evaluation items.

The timing of all

stimulus material was controlled automatically and remained
constant for each subject.

The subject module included a key pad numbered 0 to 100

which allowed the subject to respond to a three-item

Employee Evaluation Scale (EES) designed to measure the
worker's effectiveness following presentation of the CS and

the US analogs.

Subjects were asked to rate the

effectiveness of the worker Joe in causing the company's

productivity level, and also rate their confidence in their
causality judgments.

The two questions were anchored with

the phrases; totallv ineffective and totallv effective, and
no confidence and complete confidence, respectively.

In

addition, the third item on the EES required subjects to
indicate Joe's chances for becoming a permanent employee.

The question was included to sustain the masking task and
was anchored with the phrase no chance and very good chance.

The subject responses to item 3 were not included in the
analysis.

All subjects were asked to respond to the three-

item EES using a 0 to 100 point scale where lower scores
equaled lower response strength.
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Procedure

Upon entering the lab subjects were asked to read and

sign a consent form (See Appendix B).

After the subject

consented to participate, the experimenter sat the subject
in front of the subject module and started the MEL program.

Subjects received instructions via computer monitor for 60
seconds.

Following the instructions Joe, presented as a

computer generated drawing (See Appendix D), appeared for 5
seconds on the left side of the computer monitor.

After the

5 second period, a graph depicting the company's

productivity information appeared on the right side of the
computer monitor.

After both the CS and the US had been

visible for an additional 10 seconds, the entire computer
monitor went blank and item one from the EES appeared for 17

seconds.

This general procedure is analogous to delay

conditioning in Pavlovian learning.

Subjects were asked to

respond to item one using a 0-100 point scale.

Regardless

of the speed in which subjects entered their response the
item remained illuminated on the screen for a full 17

seconds.

Following the 17 second time period the entire

screen went blank and item two appeared, again

seconds.

for 17

This sequence was repeated for item three.

Following the subject's response to item three, the program

recycled to a picture of the worker, Joe.

repeated for a total of

18 trials.

The cycle was

After the subjects

completed 18 cycles they were debriefed (See Appendix C) and
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were provided the opportunity to have any questions
answered.

From the subjeets' perspective the experiment

progressed as a continuous employee evaluation cycle.

Conceptually, across eighteen trials subjects received a
combination of CS/US (acquisition) trials, no CS/US (US

alone) trials, and no CS/no US (control) trials.

Subjects

in all four groups viewed nine pairings of Joe and the

companVs productivitv information.

The four groups were

Distinguished by changes in the US alone baserate (Stimulus

materials for all 4 groups are presented in Appendix D).
Noncontinaencv fNCV Group.

The purpose of the NO Group

was to establish a noncontingent relationship between the CS

and the US.

That is, the US was just as likely to occur in

the absence of the CS as in its presence.

In addition to

the nine acquisition trials. subjects received nine US alone

trials.

Hence, on nine of the trials subjects received

information about the company productivity in the absence of
the worker.

Followihg each trial, NC Group subjects

responded to the EES described above.

The items included,

"Given all of the information you have received, on the

scale below indicate the extent to which Joe is an effective

employee in causing the company's level of productivity",
"How confident are you about your judgment of Joe's being

effective in causing the company's level of productivity",
and "Given all of the information you have received, on the
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scale below indicate Joe's overall potential for becoming a
permanent employee."

Group 2.

The purpose of Group 2 was to vary the

baserate of US alone trials against which a CS/US contiguity
occurred.

Subjects followed the same general procedure as

subjects in the NC Group except that, in addition to the
nine acquisition trials, subjects were presented just six US
alone trials.

Also, in order to balance the number of

trials received by the subjects, three control trials were
included to make the total equal 18 for each group.

Subjects evaluated Joe on the EES following each trial as in
the NC Group.

Group 3.

The purpose of Group 3 was to. vary the

baserate of US alone trials against which a CS/US contiguity
occurred.

Subjects followed the same general procedure as

subjects in the NC Group except that, in addition to the
nine acquisition trials, subjects were presented with only

three US alone trials, and six control trials.

Subjects

evaluated Joe on the EES following each trial as in the NC
Group.

Positive Continqencv fPCV Group.

The purpose of the PC

Group was to establish a positive contingency between the CS
and US.

That is, the CS occurred only in the presence of

the US.

Subjects followed the same general procedure as

subjects in the NC Group except that in addition to the nine
acquisition trials, subjects were ptesented with nine
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control trials.

Hence, the subjects never received

information about the company productivity alone.

Subjects

evaluated Joe on the EES after each trial as in the NC
Group.

'
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RESULTS

The analyses focused on the subjects' ratings of causal
strength to the worker, Joe, and the subjects' confidence in
their causal judgments.

Both dependent variables used to

test the hypothesis were measured following each of the 9

acguisition trials.

The means and standard deviations for

the subjects' estimates of cause are presented in Table 1.
A simple repeated measures model and a Groups by Trials
model was used to test predictions regarding acguisition
effects and contingency effects, respectively.
Acquisition

An inspection of the causal strength means presented in
Figure 1 indicates that the performance in Group 2 and Group

3, although hypothesized to be intermediate, revealed no

predicted effects.

It is evident that further analysis of

those two particular groups would not prove meaningful in
terms of testing the proposed hypotheses.

Mean casual

strength ratings between Groups NC and PC, however, where

differences were expected to be maximized, evidenced a

predictable outcome.

Therefore, all analyses were performed

on data from Groups NC and PC across 9 trials.

To clarify the visual presentation of the acguisition
effects a baseline was established using the subjects' mean
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Table 1

Descriptive Sbabistics for the Independent and the
Dependent Variables.

Trials

Groups

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

M

61.5

67.8

66.9

66.7

63.9

SD

18.1

11.5

15.8

16.8

19.9

M

66.3

67.8

70.3

68.5

66.7

SD

15.2

22.7

21.9

21.1

22.6

M

61.9

62.3

69.4

66.3

62.1

SD

21.9

21.9

20.1

17.7

23.9

Noncontingent

Group 2

Group 3

Positive Contingency

M

68.2

'75.0

75.4

79.7

78.9

SD

18.6

15.2

17.8

14.3

15.9

Note: N = 20
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Table 1 (cont'd)

Groups

Trials

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

M

61.6

64.4

56.1

59.0

SD

21.5

18.4

23.9

26.6

M

61.7

60.45

55.5

57.2

SD

25.5

28.3

29.8

28.4

M

56.1

62.1

60.4

61.0

SD

27.3

26.7

27.7

25.6

80.0

78.5

16.1

15.9

Noncontingent

Group 2

Group 3

Positive Contingency
M

76.5

78.0

SD

15.4

15.2

Note: N = 20
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Figure 1

Acquisition Curves of Causal Judcrments for Each Experimental
Group

75
cn
■O

70
O

65
O)

CO

§ 60

55
Trals

NC Group

Group 2

31

Group 3

PC Group

causal strength rating on Trial 1 (see Figure 2).

Inspection of overall mean differences from baseline for the
remaining 8 trials indicated that the groups differed with
regard to their average deviation from the initial
performance measure (NC Group deviation M = 1.79 vs PC Group
deviation M =9.48).

To further examine the conditioned stimulus acquisition

of causal strength, using a less descriptive strategy, a

simple repeated measures ANOVA was performed on subjects'
causal ratings across 9 trials.

Similar to learning

research, the PC Group evidenced a gradual learning curve of
causal strength.

The simple repeated measures ANOVA

performed on the subjects' causal judgments revealed a
significant acquisition effect, F (8, 152) - 2.36, p_. <
.02.

As expected, the NC Group did not evidence an

acquisition effect despite receiving the same number of
worker-productivity pairings as subjects in the PC Group.
Contingency

Drawing from contemporary

learning research, we

predicted that social causal judgments are not simply a
function of covariation, but are influenced by

conditions.

contextual

In particular, conditioned and unconditioned

stimulus pairings (i.e., Joe/company productivity) were

presented an equal number of times in each group where the
additional contextual information provided was varied.
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A

Figure 2

ACauisition Curves of Causal Judgments for the Noncontingent:
CNCV Group and the Positive contingency fPC) Group
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PC Group

2 X 9 (Groups X Trials) repeated measures ANOVA revealed
significant Group differences, F (1,38) = 9.29 e< .004, and
significant Group by Trial effect F (1,38) = 2.27 p < .02.

As expected, the PC and NC Groups differed significantly in
causal strength ratings (see Figure 2).

Although the Groups began similarly, differences
between means increased and then maximized with continued

training.

Specifically, selected pairwise comparisons

revealed that on Trial 1 the two groups did not differ

significantly with regard to the strength of their causal
judgments, t (corrected df = 220) = 1.88, p > .05.

However,

with experience, significant differences were observed
between the NC and PC Groups (e.g.. Trial 6, ^t(corrected df
= 220) = 2.61, p < .05; Trial 7, t(220) = 2.40, p < .05;

Trial 8, t(220) = 4.16, p < .05; Trial 9, t(220) == 3.44. p <
.,05.),.
Confidence

'

Given the importance of the primary measure, causal

judgment strength or strength of "invariance seeking
action," it was important to determine that the results were
hot an artifact of the conditioning procedure.

In

particular, we wanted to eliminate an alternative
explanation that conditioned causal judgment strength

ratings differed as a result of the subjects' confidence in
their judgments.

Drawing from contempofary learning

research (e.g.. Shanks & Dickinson, 1987) subjects were
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asked to rate their confidence in their causality judgment

on each conditioning trial.

A 2 X 9 (Groups X Trials)

repeated measures ANOVA revealed that neither the Groups
effect nor the interaction were statistically reliable,

suggesting that subjects' confidence was not confounded with
the conditioning treatment.

As expected, the trials effect

was significant F (8, 304) = 2.19, p < .02; that is, with
increasing experience, the subjects' confidence in their
causal judgments predictably increased across trials (see
Figure 3).
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Figure 3
AcCfuisition Curve of Confidence Ratings
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DISCUSSION

The goal of the present study was to use modern

conditioning theory to examine processes underlying human
judgments of causality.

The present study is part of a

larger program of research designed to extend previous
work in causal attribution, and as such will not only

overlap current thinking in social psychology but can
eventually contribute novel explanations and predictions
for familiar and unfamiliar results.

The causal

attribution research described in the literature, although

clearly sophisticated, does not yet contain a systematic
foundation for predicting and explaining social
attributions in context.

It was our intention to extend

attribution theory, which has primarily focused on a
simple contiguity mechanism, to include those additional

principles which guide contemporary associative learning.
Contingency effects, in learning psychology, have not

eliminated the explanatpiry power of contiguity but have

indicated that the contiguity explanation of relationship
(cause/effect) results is not sufficient for explaining
those results.

Attribution theory can be extended by

testing specific predictions about how causal attributions
acquire strength over repeated presentations of relevant
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information.

And, by specifying group differences based

upon different cause and effect (CS/US) contingencies.
Further, the associative tradition in philosophy

views conditioning not as a low-level mechanical process
in which the control over a response is passed from one
stimulus to another, but instead, as the learning that

results from exposure to relations among events in the
environment.

Given this distinction between historical

models of conditioning and contemporary learning theory,
hypotheses analogous to those developed by modern
conditioning researchers were tested.

More specifically,

we generated hypotheses to test acquisition effects and
contingency effects in social attribution.
Acquisition Effects

The hypotheses were tested by pairing a worker (CS)
and a company's productivity information (US) an equal
number of times across four groups.

Although all groups

experienced equal contiguity of the CS and the US, they

differed with regard to the baserate of the productivity
information provided (US) in the worker's absence.

According to the simple contiguity model, where context is
not an issue, all groups should have demonstrated equal
levels of causal judgment strength to the worker.

In contrast to simple contiguity model, we predicted
that acquisition was a function of CS/US contingency.

In

particular, we expected that estimates of the worker as a
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cause of the company productivity would progressively

strengthen across trials in the PC Group, and in Groups 2
and 3 where the probability of the occurrence of the US
without the OS increased, we expected lower levels of

acquisition.

In the NC Group, the company was equally

likely to meet its productivity level whether or not the
worker was present.

The worker, Joe, therefore, provided

no additional information and no acquisition effects were

predicted. In general, support for the acquisition
hypothesis was found.

As predicted, the PC Group evidenced acquisition
effects and no conditioning occurred in the NC Group,

That is, subjects made the strongest causal attributions
when there was no legitimate alternative to the worker.

In Groups 2 and 3, however, where results were expected to
be intermediate between the extreme Groups (PC and NC),

subjects responded similar to the NC Group.

The results

for Groups 2 and 3 were contrary to our predictions and
also inconsistent with previous research which examined

contingency effects using intermediate groups (Shanks &
Dickinson, 1987).

It should be noted, however, that

Shanks and Dickinson, in contrast to the present study,

did not measure causal judgmeht regarding human action.
Arguably, the group differences reported above are
not at variance with Kelley's covariation principle.

However, the specificity regarding the acquisition of
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causal judgment strength is only obtainable from
-

■

■

■

)

contemporary learning theory and serves to extend previous
work in causal attribution.

Current social theory does

not contain a mechanism for predicting the form (e.g.,

additive or multiplicative) of acquisition of causal

judgment strength. For example, simply saying that causal
attributions get stronger as more information is made
available is not sufficient to describe the results

observed in the present research.

Rather, the causal

judgments measured in the present study follow a form

frequently observed in learning psychology.

That is, the

judgment strength started at a relatively low level and

progressively increased in strength until an asymptotic
level of causal judgment strength was reached-

One possible explanation for the results is that any
productivity which occurred in the worker's absence
undermined his causal status, suggesting that in human

conditioning there may be an "all or none" mechanism.

We

could speculate that in human causal judgments the role of
the background (productivity information without Joe

present) can serve to diminish the causal priority of the
worker.

This is especially true when the "social effect

or outcome" was defined as "company productivity" rather

than individual productivity.

As a result, narrowing the

effect level of analysis closer to the worker might
increase the likelihood of finding intermediate effects.
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This post hoc explanation requires further research.
However, the higher ratings in the PC Group may argue

against the necessity of using an effect more
representative of the individual worker.
Further, an inspection of Figure 1 indicates that

subjects, unexpectedly, started out at a relatively high
level of causal strength (M = 64.88).

Theoretically,

beginning at a lower level of causal strength would have
enhanced the acquisition effect, defined as amount of

change across conditioning trials.

A possible explanation

for the higher initial ratings is that subjects had
information about a hypothetical "productivity goal" (See

appendix D).

The level of production reported each month

exceeded the arbitrary goal, therefore a certain amount of

productivity success could be inferred.

As a result,

judgments of causality and therefore acquisition of cause
did not begin at "floor" level.

In future research it is

proposed that the arbitrary goal be eliminated.
Continaencv Effects

Contingency effects hypotheses were tested by holding
the frequency of the worker and company information

provided constant across experimental groups and comparing
strength of causal judgments between groups when the
baserate of productivity information in Joe's absence was
varied.

Hence, across groups subjects received the same

information about the worker and his level of productivity
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(simple contiguity) but received this information in
different stimulus contexts.

Consistent with contemporary

learning research (e.g.. Shanks & Dickinson, 1987), the
causal priority given to the worker for the observed
effect was expected to differ as a function of the context

in which the pairing of the worker and the company meeting

it's goal took place.

That is, we expected a negative

relationship between the number of times the company goal
was met in the worker's absence and the strength of the

subject's causal judgments.

Theoretically, a simple

contiguity-sensitive process should have yielded similar
causal judgments across the four groups, however, the

results of the present research indicated that evaluations
of the worker as an effective "cause" decreased as the

baserate of the company meeting the goal in the worker's
absence increased.

A simple-contiguity sensitive mechanism could not

distinguish pairings in which the cause, in this case the
worker, was necessary for the social outcome or "effect"
from those in which the conjunction was accidental.

One

possible explanation for the differences between the NC
and PC Groups, in particular, is that in the NO Group
there was a potential source of causal agents for the
outcome (productivity goal) other than the target cause

(the worker) under consideration.

This source can be

defined as the causal background which includes all
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plausible causal agents other than the target.

Recall

that what distinguished the NC and PC Grpups was that the
outcome (productivity level) was systematically paired
with the causal background on those trials where the
worker was absent in the NC Group, but not in the PC

Group.

Hence, the reduction in the worker's causal

strength ratings in the NC Group may be the result of the

background stimuli attenuating or blocking attributions to
the worker.

The explanatory' and predictive power of the
contingency mechanism would have been strengthened had the
middle level groups proved to be reliably different from
each other and from the "extreme" conditions represented

by the NC and PC Groups.

Nevertheless, the results did

support the expectation that causal judgments must be
understood in terms of the context in which cause and

effect are presented.

From the contingency point of view,

a subject's causal judgments do not require that causes
and effects be mutually present and mutually absent.
Associations develop because the CS and US are

systematically paired.

Hence, causal judgments develop

because a cause and effect are systematically paired.

The

strength of associations do not require the subject to
receive additional information that "no CS" is followed by

"no US."

Hence, from a learning view point causal

judgments do not require the subject to receive
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information that "no cause" preceded "no effect".

Rather,

effects are assumed to be present otherwise the invariance
seeking action would not be initiated.

There are no

causal attributions in the absence of an effect.

The

contingency mechanism makes this assumption perfectly
clear in its definition of positive, negative, and zero
contingency.

The present research underscores the importance of
the "causal environment" with regard to attributions in
the work place.

Consistent with our research, Japanese

principles of management (e.g., Deming Model) suggest that
performance appraisals can be confounded by the context,
or "system" within which the individual works.

In

traditional employee evaluations, however, context effects

are not usually a consideration and as a result may lead
to erroneous conclusions regarding the worker's overall

effectiveness.

Recall that the worker's performance in

the present study did not vary across experimental groups.
However, the "supervisors" rated the worker as less

effective when company productivity information was

provided in his absence compared to the worker who was
evaluated in a context which did not include additional

productivity information.
Confidence Ratings

Theoretically, group differences in the subjects'
causal judgments were expected to be the result of
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experimental manipulations effecting the associative
process, not the result of increases or

decreases in

confidence in making the judgments themselves.

To

determine that subjects' causality judgments were not

confounded by their confidence in their judgments,

subjects were asked to rate their confidence in their

judgments using a 0 to 100 point scale.

Consistent with a

priori predictions, confidence ratings increased across
the evaluation trials, indicating increased confidence

resulting from experience, but the confidence ratings did
not differ between the NC and PC Groups.

Subjects were

not confused, rather they responded in a predictable
manner, making orderly judgments, to the stimuli

presented.

This outcome is consistent with confidence

ratings reported by Shanks and Dickinson (1987), and

provides additional support for the associative learning
model of causal judgment strength.
Limitations on Reported Effects

The results, like the results from any theory-

generated research program, should be interpreted within a
narrow range of conditions (Logan, 1959).

In fact, the

method used here serves as an explicit statement of some

of the boundary conditions, particularly in regard to the
discrete trials procedure.

In social psychology,

investigations regarding strength of causal judgments

frequently use descriptions of social action rather than
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presenting information about behavior over time.

That is,

subjects are frequently asked to make an attribution based
on information from a single observation.

The present

study, because it used analogies of a familiar learning

paradigm, involved multiple presentations of the stimuli.
Although Kelley's covariation principle pertains to
attributions resulting from multiple observations, the
context effects reported here, using the short delay

conditioning paradigm, may generalize only to situations
where information is presented repeatedly rather than

merely described.
pessimistic.

However, this caution may be too

Conditioning analogies from both

instrumental and Pavlovian learning models have

successfully been used to study a variety of social
phenomena:

attraction (Clore & Bryne, 1974; Cramer,

Weiss, Steigleder, & Balling, 1985); competition

(Steigleder, Weiss, Cramer, & Feinberg, 1978); altruism
(Weiss, Buchanan, Altstatt, & Lombardo, 1971); and male
sex-role action (Cramer, Lutz, Bartell, Dragna, & Helzer,
1989).

In addition to the limitations described above (e.g.,

arbitrary goal, definition of US, multiple observations),
the "part-time"

status Of the worker may also have

influenced subjects' causal strength ratings.

For

example, in the experimental groups where additional

company productivity information was provided in the
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worker's absence, subjects may have rated the worker as a
less effective cause of the company's productivity because

he was not employed full-time.

This procedural constraint

was necessary to explain the control trial information
indicating when "No Report" was required, and served to

equate the number of trials received by all of the

subjects. It should be noted, however, that the worker was
referred to as a part-time employee in all of the

experimental groups, including the PC Group.
Implications for Future Research

The present study focused on the subjects' strength
of causality judgments to one specific employee.

Because

of the trend toward forming small groups of employees or

teams, future research is warranted when several employees
are working together and being evaluated.

Recall that the

discounting mechanism in causal attribution noted above

suggested that the priority of a given cause in producing
an effect is attenuated if other plausible causes are

present (Kelley, 1972).

Hence, causal judgments to two or

more workers paired with productivity information is

expected to be attenuated relative to the causal judgment
strength reported in the present study, where a single
worker was evaluated.

Naive scientist explanations of the

discounting effect notwithstanding, analogies drawn from

contemporary associative learning variables can be used to

predict and explain the attenuation of causal judgment
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strength when multiple plausible causes are present.
In Pavlovian learning conditioned responding is said

to be influenced by the intensity of the US, and the

intensity is said to represent a theoretical limit on the
extent the US can influence responding.

For example, if

two CS's are conditioned individually, conditioned

responding to each stimulus should approach the
theoretical limit supportable by the US used in the
conditioning situation.

However, if the same two CS's are

presented in a stimulus compound and paired with the US,
conditioned responding to the individual stimuli is
expected to be approximately one half the strength
observed resulting from single stimulus conditioning.
Consistent with the principles guiding associative

learning, we could predict that estimates of an individual

employee (CS analog) being the cause of a company meetings

it productivity goal (US analog) will weaken when he is
evaluated with other team members (compound CS analog)

present.

In contrast, this discounting effect or loss in

causal judgment strength to the individual worker is
expected to be reversed if, after the addition of co
workers, there is an increase in the company's

productivity level.

This prediction follows from the

Pavlovian expectation that elevations in US intensity
increase conditioned responding to a relevant CS.

In

terms of causal attributions to the worker, increases in
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production level will increase causal attribution strength
despite the presence of team members.

That is, an

increase in causal judgment strength to the worker will
evidence an "undiscounting effect."

The test of these

predictions awaits future research.
Clinical Implications

In addition to the social areas described above

(attraction, competition, altruism, male sex-role action)
causal judgments also play a fundamental role in clinical

psychology (e.g., Seligman, 1975).

Therapists observe

potential causes and their effects occurring across a
period of time or what Bertrand Russell termed, "knowledge

by acquaintance" on a regular basis (see Shanks, 1991).
For example, clients often manifest their developmental

conflicts in therapy and are adept at eliciting and
engaging therapists in their conflicts.

These conflicts

can be resolved, however, when the therapist's response
reoeatedlv disconfirms their pathogenic developmental

experiences (simple contiguity).

As a result of this

"corrective emotional experience," clients discover that
it is safe to act in new and more adaptive ways (see

Teyber, 1992).

Learning is not usually complete until

after several pairings of the cause and effect have been

experienced (acquisition).

In particular, a therapist may

view a client's lack of progress as "resistance," rather

than acknowledging that an insufficient number of
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"learning trials" has occurred.

The Industrial-Organizational paradigm used in the
present study provides mundane realism for our
experimental situation (i.e., supervisor-worker
evaluations).

However, it would be more difficult to use

a clinician-client paradigm because it would require that
the subject take on the role of a therapist. The
advantages for expanding the external validity of the

present results using a clinician-client paradigm cannot
be over estimated.

For example, we could postulate that

clinical assessments of a client (attributions of cause)

who attends group therapy, in comparison to the client who
attends individual therapy, may be more subject to the
"context effects" described abdve.

Specifically, in the context of group therapy,

attributions regarding a client's behavior (internally

based causes), in particular, those behaviors which

represent completion of treatment goals and objectives
(outcome), may be influenced by context effects.

In other

words, causal judgments of a client's behavior reliably

signaling treatment goal completions is expected to more
salient in individual counseling than in group therapy.

In individual therapy the "to be explained effects"
(treatment goal completions) are only present when the
client is present.

The clinician's attributions regarding

the cause of the effects should be the strongest in this
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case.

However, in group therapy it is possible that the

"effect" could be observed in the presence of other group
members, but if the client is not in attendance, also in
the client's absence.

Such a context is expected to

produce weaker invariance seeking actions to the client.
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APPENDIX A

Instructions for all Experimental Groups

Preliminary Instructions.

In this study we are interested

in testing a computerized employee evaluation system.
Your cooperation is necessary for testing the usefulness
of this automated program. In order to carefully test the
effectiveness of the system, you will need to assume the
role of a supervisor in a large company. You will be

given information about a part-time employee, Joe and his
company's level of productivity. After reviewing a
monthly productivity report, it will be your

responsibility as Joe's supervisor to evaluate his
performance and how effective he was in causing the
company's level of productivity. Joe is a college student
who is available only for part-time employment.

he will not be present during each rating cycle.

Therefore

But it

is important to evaluate Joe carefully each month because
he will be considered for full time employment upon

graduation.
Instructions Prior to Practice Trial.

On the left side of

the screen a picture representing a part-time employee,

Joe, will be presented.

A blank screen will appear during

an evaluation cycle if Joe had not been called in to work.
On the right side of the screen a graph depicting the
company's monthly productivity goal and the level of

monthly productivity will be presented.

During an

evaluation cycle it is possible a blank screen would
appear for a month where no report was submitted. Two
blank screens may appear if Joe was not called in to work
and a monthly report was not submitted.
Instructions Prior to Estimates of Causal Strength.

Following each monthly productivity report you will be
asked to answer five items on a '0 - 100' point scale.

After reading the item carefully, please respond by using
the numeric key pad on the right side of the keyboard.
After entering your '0 - 100' response, please wait for
the next evaluation item to appear.
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APPENDIX B

CONSENT FORM

I am volunteering to participate as a subject in this
study. I understand that the purpose of this study is to
test the efficiency of a computerized employee evaluation
system. I understand that the information will be
presented via a computer monitor and that I will be asked
to assume the role of a production supervisor in a large
company. I understand that my name will NOT be included
in the experiment itself and that my anonymity will be
maintained at all times.

I also understand that my

participation in this study is
refuse to answer any questions
understand that I may withdraw
without penalty or prejudice.
questions I may have regarding

voluntary and that I may
at any time. I also
from this study at any time
I also understand that any
this study will be

answered.

I understand that all the information collected in this

study will be treated as confidential with no details
about my responses released to anyone outside the research
staff without my separate and specific written consent. I
understand that I may derive no specific benefit from

participation in this study, except perhaps from knowing
that I have contributed to the development of

psychological knowledge.
I hereby allow this research group to publish the results
of this study in which I am Participating, with the
provision that my name and/or other identifying
information be withheld.

This study is being conducted by

psychology students under the supervision of Dr. Robert
Cramer, PS-211, extension 5576. I understand that if I
have any questions or concerns about the study or the
informed consent process I may also contact the Psychology

Department Human Subjects Review Board at CSUSB.
Participant's Signature:

'

Participant's Name (Printed):
Date:

■
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APPENDIX C

DEBRIEFING STATEMENT

The present study is part of a series of research

projects designed to investigate human social causal
judgments. Unfortunately, in order to adequately
investigate this social phenomenon a small deception of
the subjects, was necessary- Rather than directly asking
questions concerning your social causal judgments, we
explained the study as testing the efficiency of a
computerized Employee Evaluation System. The company, its
employees, and the evaluation system were fictitious. We
apologize for this deception, however, if we had asked
directly about your causal judgments your responses may
have been effected.

(Stop. Are there any questions?)
It is our sincere hope that the necessity for
deception is understood. It is important for the

completion of this study that you do not speak with other
students on campus about your experiences here today. If
other potential subjects are aware of the purpose of the

experiment, the results of the study might be compromised.
The present study conforms to the ethical principles
established by the American Psychological Association. We
are interested in obtaining your comments or reaction

regarding your participation in our experiment. This
information would serve as a basis for checking and

evaluating the quality and care with which our research is
conducted. Please feel free to comment or ask questions.
For results concerning the present study contact Dr.
Robert Cramer, (714) 880-5576.
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APPENDIX D
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Appendix D (cont'd)
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Appendix D (con'd)
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